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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Mr. Justice Holmes has consistently held that there is nothing
unconstitutional in double taxation and that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has been stretched too far in the cases above referred to. In
these views, Justice Brandeis has concurred. Nevertheless, they
acquiesce in the case under discussion in view of the failure of their
previous views to obtain the concurrence of a majority. The failure
of the dissent to reiterate its position affords the conclusion that
double taxation may now definitely be stated to be beyond the power
of the states under the Constitution. In vain did Justice Holmes
remark:
"It seems to me to be exceeding our powers to declare
such a tax a denial of due process of law. And what are
the grounds? Simply, as far as I can see, that it is disagree-
able to a bond owner to be taxed in two places." 15
And again, in suggesting a remedy he says:
"Very probably it might be a good policy to restrict taxa-
tion to a single place and perhaps the technical conception of
domicile may be the best determinant. But it seems to me
that if that result is to be reached it should be reached through
understanding among the states, by uniform legislation or
otherwise, not by evoking a constitutional prohibition from
the void of 'due process of law' when logic, tradition and
authority have united to declare the right of the state to lay
the now prohibited tax." 16
The judicial vacillation with regard to the meaning of due proc-
ess of law is now familiar learning. But the extent of federal con-
trol over state legislation which the Fourteenth Amendment has made
possible, is still to be fully realized.
FRANCES MASLOW.
ESTATE TAX-SUCCESsIoN TAX-POWER TO RETROACTIVELY
TAX FUTURE INTERESTs-CONTRACTS.-By an irrevocable trust
created in 1907, settlors retained a life income during their joint
lives, the principal to be paid over to their five sons on the death of
the survivor of the settlors. If any of the sons should predecease
the survivor then, over to those entitled to take his intestate prop-
erty. In 1917, the settlors assigned their interest in the trust to their
sons, all of whom survived the termination of the trust. The settlors
died in 1921 and 1923 respectively, and Massachusetts sought to tax
'Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1930); see also(1930) 5 St. John's L. Rev. 136.
" Baldwin v. Missouri, at p. 596; Dissenting opinion of Holmes, J.
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the beneficiaries under a 1921 successtion tax.' Its imposition was
upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. On appeal,
Held, reversed. Statutes imposing excise tax on succession to prop-
erty under trust deeds taking effect before amendment repugnant
to contract and due process clauses of the Federal Constitution.
Coolidge v. Long, 51 Sup. Ct. 306 (1931).
This decision is a significant one involving the succession tax
statutes of nearly all the states in the Union.2  Since trust deeds
disposing a fund on the death of settlors, without power of revo-
cation are contracts, a state is without authority, by subsequent legis-
lation, to impair or destroy rights vesting thereunder.3 But, to be
obnoxious to the contract clause a statute must act upon the contract
so as to interfere with the rights of enforcement. 4 The power to tax
property, or a right, status, or privilege, enjoyed by virtue of a con-
tract, is in no wise impeded by the fact of the existence of the con-
tract, whether it antedates or follows the effective date of the taxing
act, though it makes less valuable the fruits of a private contract.5
Whether the interest of the beneficiaries were so completely vested
is the fundamental question, asserts the Court.6 When a privi-
lege has ripened into a right it cannot be impaired 7 is the touch-
stone of the Court's argument but the method utilized begs the
"Mass. Gen. Laws c. 65, Sec. 1: "All property within the jurisdiction of
the commonwealth * * * which shall pass by * * * deed, grant or gift, except
in cases of a bona fide purchase for full consideration in money or moneys
worth * * * made or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after
his death * * * to any person, absolutely or in trust * * * shall be subject to
a tax."
Sec. 36: "This chapter shall apply only to property or interests therein
passing or accruing upon the death of persons dying on or after May fourth,
nineteen hundred and twenty."
2 Twenty-one states and territories have statutes containing provisions
substintially similar to those of Massachusetts involved in this appeal. New
York's statute is contained in ch. 60, See. 249b, Consol. Laws 1930.
'Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 624, 656, 4 L. ed. 629
(U. S. 1819); Carondelet Canal Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U. S. 362, 378, 34
Sup. Ct. 627, 58 L. ed. 1001 (1913); Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.
S. 364, 46 Sup. Ct. 569, 70 L. ed. 992 (1925). These cases do not, however,
remotely bear on the questions here raised, whether a tax levied in respect
of the future enjoyment of property which chanced to be acquired under an
earlier contract impairs the contract.
.Moffit v. Kelly, 218 U. S. 402, 403, 31 Sup. Ct. 79, 54 L. ed. 1086, 30
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1179 (1910).
' North Missouri R. R. v. Maguire, 20 Wall. 46 22 L. ed. 287 (U. S.
1873); Clement National Bank v. Vermont, 231 U. S. 120. 34 Sup. Ct. 31,
58 L. ed. 147 (1913) ; Lake Superior Mines v. Lord, 271 U. S. 577, 46 Sup.
Ct. 627, 70 L. ed. 1039 (1925).
'Butler, J. at p. 309-He decides in the affirmative since "* * * upon
the happening of the event specified * * * the trustees were bound to hand
over the property to the beneficiaries. * * * The succession when the time
came, did not depend upon any permission or grant of the commonwealth."
IMatter of Pell, 171 N. Y. 48, 63 N. E. 589, 57 L. R. A. 540, 89 A. S. R.
791 (1902); Matter of Craig, 97 App. Div. 289, 89 N. Y. Supp. 971 (2nd
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question. It is submitted that the position of the majority is unten-
able on the grounds of both reason and authority. To consider
a future interest of the beneficiaries completely vested under circum-
stances making it vested subject to complete divestiture does violence
to hitherto accepted classification of future interest,8 as well as con-
trary to most of the previous Supreme Court decisions.9 Also dis-
regarded, is a long line of Massachusetts cases 10 which the Court
was bound to consider." The Supreme Court has reasserted that
the legal abstraction does not preclude a succession tax on the
occasion of acquiring actual possession and enjoyment of the prop-
erty.12  For centuries, the receipt or fruition of possession or
control has been the taxable occasion. 18 So to consider the succes-
sion tax applicable only at the inception of the future interest is as
startling as it is unique. In all its decisions touching death duties
whether succession or transfers 14 the Court has constantly disre-
garded the technical aspect of a transfer for its reality and sub-
stance. 15 The "vesting" in the instant case was clearly technical.
Drawing an analogy from income tax decisions, a tax on succession
after a future interest has been created, but before actual enjoyment
is no more a denial of due process than a tax upon income accrued
prior to the adoption of the taxing statute but received after its
passage, which is clearly constitutional. 16 Viewed from the doctrine
Dept., 1904), aff'd 181 N. Y. 551, 74 N. E. 1116 (1905) ; Hunt v. Wicht, 174
Cal. 205, 162 Pac. 639 (1917).
'R. R. Powell, Cases in Future Interests, (1929) p. 35 et seq.
Cohen v. Brewster, 203 U. S. 543, 27 Sup. Ct. 174. 51 L. ed. 310, 8
Ann. Cas. 215 (1906); Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278, 22 Sup. Ct. 213, 46
L. ed. 196 (1901); Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 U. S. 466, 27 Sup. Ct. 550, 51 L.
ed. 882 (1906).
"Atty.-Gen. v. Stone, 209 Mass. 186. 95 N. E. 395 (1911); Magee v.
Com. of Corp., 256 Mass. 512, 153 N. E. (1926)' and cases cited.
'Michel v.' Cole, 256 U. S. 222, 41 Sup. Ct. 467, 65 L. ed. 900 (1920);
Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260. 48 Sup. Ct. 225 (1927); Stebbins
v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 45 Sup. Ct. 424, 69 L. ed. 884, 44 A. L. R. 1454(1924).
" Clapp v. Mason 94 U. S. 589, 23 L. ed. 212 (1876); Vanderbilt v.
Erdman, 196 U. S. 480, 492, 25 Sup. Ct. 331, 49 L. ed. 563 (1909); Hertz
v. Woodman, 218 U. S. 205, 30 Sup. Ct. 621, 54 L. ed. 1001 (1909).
"Digby, History of the Law of Real Property (5 ed.) 40. defines feudal
relief; Gleason & Otis, Inheritance Taxation (4 ed.) 243; Nielson v. John-
son, 279 U. S. 47, 49 Sup. Ct. 223 (1928).
'For distinction between Transfer and Succession Tax see Note (1930)
5 St. John's L. Rev. 147.
'5 Chase Nat. Bank v. U. S., 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126. 73 L. ed.
405, 63 L. R. A. 338 (1928); Tyler v. U. S., 281 U. S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct.
356, 74 L. ed. 991 (1929) and cases cited; see also (1930) 9 St. John's L.
Rev. 135.
" Brushaber v. U. P. R. R.. 240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct. 236, 60 L. ed.
493, L. R. A. 1917 D. (1915); Lynch v. Hornsby, 247 U. S. 339, 38 Sup.
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of whether "economic benefits shifted" to the beneficiaries at the sur-
vivor's death, the decision is without one instance of soundness.1 7
W. H. S.
ESTATE TAx-TRANSFER TAx-DIsCRETION IN REMITTING
ASSETS TO FOREIGN STATE TO PERMIT IMPOSITION OF FOREIGN
TAx.-The State of Connecticut petitioned the Surrogate's Court
to direct the executor of the will of the decedent Alice C. Martin,
to remit certain securities of the estate to an administrator c.t.a. ap-
pointed in Connecticut, the testatrix's domicile. The purpose was to
permit the assessment and collection in Connecticut of a tax upon
the transfer of securities (now in N. Y. State) effected by the will.
Held, petition denied. Return of assets to another state is not a
relief to be demanded as of right but ig entirely discretionary. The
exercise of the discretion having been approved by the Appellate
Division, may not be revised except for manifest abuse. Matter of
Martin, 255 N. Y. 359 (1931).
In comity, courts should not aid foreign estates which seek to
deprive the state of the testator's domicile of property rights.1 But
comity does not require the remittance of assets to the state of domi-
cile merely in order that distribution may be there made.2 In all
events, the Surrogate's power, if any, to direct the transfer of assets
to a foreign state rests within his discretion.3  Since in the instant
case compliance with the petition would result in the depletion of the
assets by unnecessary and wasteful duplication of administrations
and accounting, the Surrogate's discretion is clearly sound. The
question of comity in the administration of taxes on intangibles
made significant by recent U. S. Supreme Court decisions 4 was
politely deferred, since no assessment or claim of any lien presently
enforceable was present.
W. H. S.
Ct. 543, 62 L. ed. 1149 (1917); Cooper v. U. S., 280 U. S. 409, 50 Sup. Ct.
164, 74 L. ed. 516 (1929).
'7 Rothschaeffer, Taxation of Transfer Intended to Take Effect in Pos-
session or Enjoyment at Grantors Death, (1930) 14 Minn. L. Rev. 453 and
603; also supra note 14.
'Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918).
2Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N. Y. 103 (1859); Despard v. Churchill, 53
N. Y. 192 (1873); Higgins v. Eaton, 202 F. 75 (C. C. A., 2nd, 1912). •
2 Matter of Hughes, 95 N. Y. 55 (1884); People ex rel Ligget v. Fether-
ston, 223 N. Y. 679. 119 N. E. 1069 (1918); Surrogate's Court Act, Sec.
309; C. P A., Sec. 589.
'Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Missouri, 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct.
98 (1930); Baldvin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 439 (1930).;
Beidler v. S. Car. Tax. Comm.. 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup. Ct. 54 (1930), which
overrule Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903).
